Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 2

Fall 9-1-1940

A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940
Karl R. Bendetson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Karl R. Bendetson, A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 2 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1 (1940).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol2/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume II

FALL, 1940

Number i

A DISCUSSION OF
THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS'
CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1940
-

KARL

R. BENDETSON*

Enactment of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, approved October 27, 1940,1 has given rise to considerable speculation and

interest.
The extent to which this statute will affect the general practitioner
is not yet calculable. Few deny that it will be of genuine concern to the
many businessmen whose enterprises embrace installment selling. Every
business transaction accomplished prior to October 17, 1940 involving
a male of selective service age may be materially affected by the measure.
To a substantial degree all pending legislation and all future transactions to which a potential selectee or volunteer is a party may be influenced.
The purpose and scope of this article will be to present, first, a brief
history of the enactment; second, a resume of its provisions; third, a
statement of the general method of the statute; fourth, a critical appraisement; and fifth, a discussion of its constitutionality.
I.

HISTORY OF THE STATUTE

At the outset, it is pertinent to recall that Congress enacted similar
legislation during the World War in the act of March 8, 1918.2 This legislation was known as "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act." The
original draft was prepared in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, under the supervision of Professor John H. Wigmore,
now Dean Emeritus of the School of Law, Northwestern University,
then on active duty as a major in that office. The Secretaries of War and

0 Captain, Judge Advocate

General's Department, United States Army. The opin-

ions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily embrace
the views of the Judge Advocate General or the War Department.
2Public, No. 861, 76th Congress.

24o Stat. 44o.
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Navy joined in a letter commending the draft to Congress. That draft
was introduced into the Senate as S. 2859, 65 th Congress. It was concurrently introduced into the House of Representatives as H. R. 61 o,
65 th Congress. The bills were referred to the respective Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and House. The House Committee worked
over the submitted draft and produced a new bill, H. R. 6361. That bill
was the vehicle for the act of March 8, 19183 in which form, with minor
amendments, it became law.4 The 1918 enactment expired by its own
5
limitation six months following the termination of the World War.
During the spring and early summer of 1940, the War Department
took under consideration the advisability of undertaking the preparation of a draft of similar legislation for submission to the Congress
should the necessity arise. During the course of this study and prior to
its completion, the President, on July 29, 194o, requested Congress to
grant him authority to order the National Guard of the United States,
together with Regular Army retired personnel and Reserve officers, to
active duty. On July 3o, 1940, Senator Sheppard introduced Senate
Joint Resolution No. 286, to carry into effect the President's request. On
August 1, 1940, Senator Overton introduced as an amendment to the
Resolution, a provision designed to revive and extend certain benefits
of the 1918 act. Senate Joint Resolution No. 286 was the vehicle for the
enactment of Public Resolution No. 96, 7 6th Congress, approved
August 27, 1940, section 4 whereof carried the Overton proposal. This
measure is popularly known as "The National Guard Bill." During
this period and on August 14, 1940, Senator Overton introduced an
amendment to Senate Bill No. 4164, 76th Congress, the Selective Training and Service bill, identical in substance to the one he introduced on
August 1, 1940, in connection with the National Guard bill. That
amendment, with certain changes, was the vehicle for section 13 of the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.6 On August 12, 1940, Mr.
May, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, introduced H. R. 10338, 7 6th Congress, a bill embodying in
substance all of the provisions of the 1918 law, with certain modifications proposed by the War Department, some of which were predicated
34o Stat. 440.
'Hearings and memoranda before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 65th Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions, on S. 2859 and
H. R. 6361. See Ferry, Rosenbaum and Wigmore, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Rights Bill (1918) 12 Ill. L. Rev. 449.
"Section 6o3 , 40 Stat. 440.
Public, No. 783, 7 6th Congress, approved September 16, 194o.
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upon the recommendation of the heads of other interested Government
departments whose suggestions had been requested during the course of
preparation of the draft by the War Department. On August 14, 1940,
Senator Overton introduced S. 4270, 76th Congress, embodying provisions substantially identical with those carried in H. R. 10338. The
differences embodied changes incorporated by Senator Overton, and
were all in connection with the persons to whom the benefits of the act,
7
if approved, would apply.
In view of the Overton amendments to the pending National Guard
and Selective Training and Service bills, proposing to revive certain
provisions of the 1918 act, with the introduction of S.427 o and H. R.
10338 a rather complicated legislative situation developed. Among the
difficulties presented by the Overton amendments to the Selective Service and National Guard bills, was that involving a determination of
just what, if any, protection would be afforded to persons ordered into
military service following enactment of the legislation. This was true
because section 4 of Public Resolution No. 96, the National Guard bill,
provides, inter alia:
"The benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act,
approved March 8, are hereby extended to all * * * personnel
ordered into active military service under authority of this joint
resolution * * * and except as hereinafter provided, the provisions of such Act shall be effective for such purposes."
Similarly, section 13 of Public, No. 783, 7 6th Congress, the Selective
Service law, provides, inter alia:
"The benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act,
approved March 8, 1918, are hereby extended to all persons inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act, and to all
members of any reserve component of such forces now or hereafter on active duty for a period of more than one month; and,
except as hereinafter provided, the provisions of such Act of
March 8, 1918, shall be effective for such purposes."
A rather nice legal question is presented in determining just what.
are and what are not the "benefits" of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, approved March 8, 1918. Furthermore, to extend the benefits of a statute no longer in existence is at least of questionable effect.
Moreover, whereas the National Guard bill covers all reserve componT
As originally introduced by Senator Overton, S. 4270, section ios (i) was designed to cover only those persons proposed to be ordered to duty under the pending
National Guard and Selective Training and Service bills. Those excluded from the
benefits of the bill as submitted by Senator Overton included all persons voluntarily
enlisting in the Army and Navy.
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ents of the Army of the United States, together with retired personnel
of the Regular Army, section 13 of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 194o, approved some twenty days later, repeats coverage as to
all members of the reserve components of the Army of the United
States ordered to active duty, applies to those inducted through selection for training and service, but excludes Regular Army retired personnel. The exceptions embraced in the phrase "except as hereinafter
provided" in each of the two foregoing quotations, are not uniform,
and therefore, the uncertainties presented by section 4 of the National
Guard Law were further complicated by section 13 of the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940. Instead of perceiving that the best
way out of the situation was the abandonment of the Overton proposals and the enactment of a new bill establishing uniformity and
removing all doubt conceining just what protection and benefits were
to be extended to persons in military service, considerable confusion
befogged the matter, and the Overton amendments were nevertheless
enacted as provisions of the National Guard and Selective Service bills.
However, on September 30, 194o, the Senate enacted S. 4270, with

certain amendments, which will be discussed later, and transmitted the
same to the House. On October 3, 1940, the House of Representatives
took under consideration, by unanimous consent, H. R. 10338. Certain
amendments thereto were made from the floor, which amendments will
also be discussed later. Thereafter, on the same date the House substituted the provisions of the bill H. R. 10338, as amended from the floor,
for S. 427 o , having struck out of S. 427o all matter after the enacting
clause of the Senate bill. On October 5, the committee of conference on
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the
House to S. 4270, convened and recommended that the Senate recede
from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the
same with an amendment. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives agreed to the conference reports without objection. The bill
S. 4270 thus became the vehicle for the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.8

During the pendency of these bills both Committees on Military
Affairs of the Senate and House of Representatives conducted hearings
during the course of which, amendments were made to the bills as
initially introduced. It is proposed to direct a few comments toward a
critical appraisement of the enactment in section IV hereof, and it is
Public, No. 861, 7 6th Congress, approved October 17, 1940.
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believed that a discussion of these hearings more properly belongs in
that section.
II. A

RESUME OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE

Acr

In presenting a brief resume of the provisions of the statute, quotations from each section will be employed only where essential.
A.

ARTICLE

I-General Provisions

Section ioo is the introductory paragraph. It recites that "the following provisions are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons" who are in military service, where such proceedings and transactions would be prejudical if not temporarily suspended. It is stated
that the object is "to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national
defense under the emergent conditions which are threatening the peace
and security of the United States." It is further declared that the objective is "to enable the United States the more successfully to fulfill
the requirements of the national defense, * * *". The paragraph states

that persons in military service will thus be enabled "to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation, * * ". The recitations

of Section ioo are of importance only in connection with a consideration of the constitutionality of the provisions enacted. It is, of course,
elementary that the recitations themselves, standing alone, are of no
value unless there is some reasonable conformity between the recitations, the constitutional power invoked, and the actual objective of and
result to be expected from the statute.
Section ioi is one of definition. Subdivision (I) thereof defines five
phrases. These are: (I) "persons in military service", (2) "persons in
the military service of the United States", (3) "military service", (4)
"active service", and (5) "active duty". The phrases "persons in military service" and "persons in the military service of the United States"
are declared to be synonymous, and they are stated to "include the following persons and no others:"
(i) All members of the Army of the United States.
(2) All members of the United States Navy.
(3) All members of the Marine Corps.
(4) All members of the Coast Guard.
(5) All officers of the Public Health Service detailed by proper
authority for duty either with the Army or "the Navy.
It is pertinent to consider just what elements are included in the
foregoing classification of persons. The Army of the United States is
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defined by statute.9 It consists of (a) the Regular Army, (b) the National Guard of the United States, (c) the National Guard while in
the service of the United States,' 0 (d) the Officers' Reserve Corps, (e)
the Organized Reserves, and (f) the Enlisted Reserve Corps." The
United States Navy is also defined by statute. It includes the Regular
Navy,' 2 the Naval Reserve,' 3 which includes the Fleet Reserve, the Organized Reserve, the Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Reserve. The Volunteer Reserve of the Naval Reserve includes such female registered nurses as may be appointed by the Secretary of the
Navy.' 4 The Marine Corps is under the supervision and direction of the
Navy Department and in addition to the Regular Marine Corps includes a Marine Corps Reserve.'5 Neither the Coast Guard nor the
Public Health Service has reserve components. The Selective Training
and Service Act permits the induction of persons into the land or naval
forces. 16
'Section i of the National Defense Act, act of June 3, 1916 (89 Stat. 166), as
amended by the act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 759), as amended by the act of June 15,
1933 (48 Stat. 153); o U. S. C. A. 2. N. B.: While the National Defense Act is not
expressly amended by the Selective Training and Service Act of 194o, act of September 16, 1940 (Public, No. 783, 76th Cong.), nevertheless, all persons selected for
induction will be upon induction and acceptance, a part of the Army of the United
States in the broad sense of the term. Even if this were not so, by section 3 (d) of the
Selective Service Act such persons will be "paid, allowed and extended the same pay,
allowances 0 0 * and other benefits as are provided by law in the case of other enlisted men of like grade and length of service * * *".The inclusion of selectees within the benefits accorded by the act is therefore beyond doubt.
"The Constitution expressly limits the purposes for which the National Guard
of the several states and territories may be ordered into Federal service. These are
(i) "to execute the laws of the Union," (2) to "suppress insurrections," and (3) to
"repel invasions" (Art. 1, § 8, cl.15). Congress has therefore established the National
Guard of the United States in order to provide a ready reserve component not thus
fettered. It consists of the same persons comprising the National Guard of the several states and territories, provided such persons have met the necessary physical and
professional qualifications to be enlisted or appointed in the National Guard of the
United States. The persons whom the President is authorized to order to active duty
under the National Guard law are the officers and men of the National Guard of
the United States, not the members of the National Guard of the several states and
territories.
"So far as is known at this time, no members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps are
on active duty. Only a portion of the members of the Officers' Reserve Corps are on
extended active duty, for the most part by their own consent, although the National
Guard law, supra, authorizes the President to place them on extended active duty
for twelve months without their consent.
"Chapters .and 2, 34 U. S. C. A., 4 et seq.
"Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1175, 34 U. S. C. A., Supp., 853, known as the Naval
Reserve Act of 1938.
"Act June .5,
1938, 52 Stat. 1176, 34 U. S. C. A., Supp. 853b.
"Act June 25, 1938. 52 Stat. 1175, 34 U. S. C. A., Supp. 853a.
"See Section 3 (a), Public No. 783, 76th Congress, approved Sept. 16, 1940.

1940]

CIVIL RELIEF ACT

"Military service" is defined by subdivision (i) of section ioi as
"Federal service on active duty" with any component of the services and
branches named above. It also includes "trainini or education under
the supervision of the United States preliminary to induction into the
military service". For example, if a state National Guard unit was
undergoing its ordinary annual fortnight of field training, this would
not be "Federal service". However, if a situation developed whereby
there was constitutional authority for calling a state National Guard
unit as such into the service of the United States and as a preliminary
to an actual mustering of such an organization into the Federal service
it was undergoing preliminary training, it would doubtless be considered as within the terms of the section.
The terms "active service" or "active duty" are declared to be
synonymous and are defined to "include the period during which a
person in military service is absent from duty on account of sickness,
wounds, leave, or other lawful cause."
Subdivision (2) of section 1oi defines the "period of military service". It is an important definition, because in many instances the period
over which a proceeding or transaction may be stayed or suspended is
measured by the "period of military service". It is also important because it may be controlling as to whether a particular individual is entitled to any relief at all. The phrase is defined in the following manner:
As to persons in active service on the date when the act was approved
(October 17, 194o), their service is deemed to have commenced on the
date of the approval of the act. As to persons entering active service
following the approval of the legislation, their service commences with
the date of enlistment, appointment, or actual induction. In the latter
case, induction is not complete until the military authorities accept the
selectee, that is, find him physically and otherwise qualified. The period
of active service terminates either (i) with the date of discharge from
active service, or (2) upon death while in active service. In no case
17
may this be later than the date when the act itself ceases to be in force.
Subdivision (3) defines "person" when used in the act with reference to the holder of any right alleged to exist against a person in military service or against a person secondarily liable under such alleged
right. Included are: individuals, partnerships, corporations and any
other form of business association.
Section 1o2 (i) declares that the provisions of the act shall apply not
"'Section 604 governs the effective period of the statute. See Section II, F, fifth
paragraph, infra.
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only within the United States and its territories, but also in "all territories subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including the
Philippine Islands while under the sovereignty of the United States."
It obtains in respect of any proceedings commenced in any of the
courts situated in the foregoing places. It is important to note that the
provisions of the act are required to be enforced "through the usual
forms of procedure obtaining in such courts or under such regulations
as may be by them prescribed".
Subdivision (2) of section io2 permits application to any court for
relief under the act where no proceeding has already been commenced
with respect to the matter.
Subdivision (I) of section 103 gives the court discretionary power
to make applicable any stay, postponement or suspension granted by it
in respect of anyone in military service to "sureties, guarantors, indorsers, and others subject to the obligation or liability, the performance or enforcement of which is stayed, postponed, or suspended."
Subdivision (2) of section 1o3 grants similar discretion to the court
in favor of sureties, guarantors, indorsers, and other persons liable with
regard to setting aside or vacating in whole or in part any judgment or
decree as provided in the act with respect to persons in military service.
B.

ARTICLE

II-GeneralRelief

Section 20o relates to instances where in any action or proceeding
commenced in any court there is a default of appearance by the defendant. The section consists of four subdivisions and is very farreaching in the sense that before any plaintiff may take a default judgment, a certain definite procedure must be followed. This is so whether
or not it has appeared in the proceeding that the defendant or, if there
is more than one defendant, any one of the defendants is in military
service. Before taking a default judgment, the plaintiff, if he can, is required to file an affidavit that the defendant is not in military service.
If he is unable to file such an affidavit, the plaintiff must in lieu thereof
file an affidavit setting forth either (I) that the defendant is in military service or (2) that the plaintiff is unable to determine the status of
the defendant in this respect. If no affidavit is filed, no judgment may
be entered without first securing an order directing such entry. In any
event, no such order shall be made if the defendant is in military service until the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent such

defendant and protect his interests. Unless it appears that the defend-
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ant is not in military service the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond approved by the court, conditioned to indemnify the defendant
"if in military service, against any loss or damage that he may suffer by
reason of any judgment should the judgment be set aside in whole or
in part." Moreover, the court is empowered to make such other and
further order or enter such judgment as in its opinion may be necessary to protect the rights of the defendant under the act.
Subdivision (2) declares that the use of an affidavit known to be
false, is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one
year or by fine not to exceed $iooo, or both.
Subdivision (3) reaffirms the court's power to appoint an attorney
to represent a person in military service where such party does not have
his own attorney and does not personally appear. The attorney appointed by the court, however, has no "power to waive any right of the
person for whom he is appointed or bind him by his acts."
Subdivision (4) relates to the vacating, setting aside, or reversing of
judgments entered against persons in military service during the period
of such service or within thirty days thereafter. Within ninety days
after the termination of such service, such a judgment may be opened
and the person let in to defend, provided a showing is made that the
person involved was prejudiced by reason of his military service in
making his defense to the action and further, that he has a meritorious
or legal defense to the action or some part thereof. The intervening
rights of any bona fide purchasers for value under such judgments are
expressly protected.
Section 201 relates to the granting of stays in any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in military service is involved either
as plaintiff or defendant. If the application is made during the period
of such service or within sixty days thereafter, the court may, in its
discretion, grant a stay. Where it appears that the ability of the plaintiff to prosecute the action, or of the defendant to conduct his defense,
is not materially impaired or affected by reason of his military service,
a stay is discretionary, otherwise it is mandatory. 18
Section 202 relieves against fines and penalties accruing in any case
by reason of the failure to comply with the terms of any contract during the period of any stay ordered by a court in a proceeding instituted
to enforce compliance with such contract. Courts are also empowered to
relieve against a contractual fine or penalty for nonperformance on
such terms as may be just where it appears (i) that the person was in
28The period of stay is governed by section 204, infra.
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the military service when the penalty was incurred and (2) that the
ability of the person to pay or perform was impaired by reason of such
military service.
Section 203 relates to stays of execution and the vacation or stay of
any attachment -or garnishment whether before or after judgment. In
respect of any proceeding commenced against a person in military
service, either before or during or within sixty days after such military
service, the court is given discretionary power on its own motion to stay
execution or vacate or stay any attachment or garnishment. Such action
is mandatory upon application to the court by such person, or by
someone on his behalf, unless the ability of the defendant to comply
with the judgment or order is not materially affected by reason of his
military service.
Section 204 governs the period over which a stay may be granted.
The maximum period is for the duration of the military service of the
person affected and for three months thereafter. Stays may be subject
to such terms as the court deems just, including a direction to pay installments in such amounts and at such times as the court may fix. It is
provided that where the person in military service is a co-defendant
with others, the court may nevertheless proceed against the others. This
section is the one around which the entire act revolves, (excluding, of
course, the insurance provisions of Article IV, and, in part, the provisions of Article V) in the sense that it specifies the measure of relief in
connection with the stay of transactions and proceedings affecting
persons in military service.
C.

ARTICLE

III-Rent, Installment Contracts,and Mortgages

Section 300 relates exclusively to rent, to the relation of landlord
and tenant. Except in respect of a proceeding to collect unpaid rent
after the relation of landlord and tenant has terminated, a proceeding
which would be governed by Article II, this section contains the whole
measure of relief afforded in this sphere. It comprises four subdivisions.
The relief afforded is limited to the wife, children or other dependents
of a person in military service. Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, where an individual without dependents enters military service, no basis is afforded by this act alone for a termination of an existing
contract of lease. A person without dependents is given no relief except
that which may be afforded him by reason of the provisions of Article
II, and then only, of course, where his landlord sues for unpaid rent
and the person affected is able to show that his military service has
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materially impaired his capacity to pay. In such case the proceeding
for collection of the unpaid rent may be stayed for the period of military service and up to three months thereafter. 19
Subdivision (1) is limited in application to premises occupied
chiefly for dwelling purposes where the agreed rent does not exceed $8o
per month and where the premises are occupied by "the wife, children,
or other dependents of a person in military service". It prohibits summary proceedings for eviction or distress and provides that no eviction
or distress shall be made during the period of military service "except
upon leave of court granted upon application therefor" or granted in
an action or proceeding affecting the right of possession.
Where the military service of the person whose wife, children, or
other dependents are sought to be evicted has materially affected or
impaired his ability to pay the agreed rent, subdivision (2) provides
that the court may stay the proceedings for eviction or distress for not
longer than three months or "make such other order as may be just."
Subdivision (3) makes a misdemeanor the action of any person
who knowingly participates in an eviction or distress other than as
provided in subdivision (i) of this section. A punishment of one year's
imprisonment or $iooo fine or both may be imposed.
Subdivision (4) permits compulsory allotments. It empowers certain officials "to order an allotment of pay of a person in military service in reasonable proportion to discharge the rent of premises occupied
for dwelling purposes" by his dependents. This power is accorded in
appropriate cases to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy,
and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard. No
provision is made with regard to officers of. the Public Health Service
detailed with the Army or Navy. It is probable that the Secretary of
War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, would be empowered to make such an order.
Section 301 relates to contracts of conditional sale and to contracts
of lease or bailment with a view to the purchase of real or personal
property. It relates only to those contracts executed prior to October 17,
194o, the date of approval of the act. Unless an installment had been
paid prior to the date on which the statute was approved, no contract of
this nature executed subsequent to October 17, 1940, is in any way
affected by the provisions of Article III. Of course, on a suit to enforce
payment of the balance of the purchase price, where the conditional
vendor or his assignee had elected to pass title and sue for the price,
'Sections 203 and 2o4, Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of ig4o.
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the provisions of Article II might afford some relief and would affect
such a proceeding irrespective of when the contract was executed.
Subdivision (i) of section 3o forbids the exercise of any right or
option, under such a contract, to rescind or terminate the contract or
resume possession of the property for nonpayment of any installment
falling due during the period of the military service of the vendee
"except by action in a court of competent jurisdiction". Stated otherwise, the summary right to repossession may no longer be exercised out
of court as to contracts of this nature which are within the act. It is
necessary to institute a proceeding and make application for forfeiture
and repossession. Of interest is the proviso at the end of the section,
presumably added for the purpose of clarity. 20 It expressly permits the
modificaton, termination, or cancellation of any such contract and the
repossession of the property conditionally sold pursuant to the mutual
agreement of the parties or their assignees, where such agreement is
executed in writing "subsequent to the making of such contract and
during or after the period of military service of the person concerned."
It is probable that the right to rescind by mutual agreement would have
remained unaffected had this proviso been omitted. It is now fettered
by the requirement that a rescissory agreement must be in writing and
must be executed after the commencement of military service.
Subdivision (2) makes a resumption of possession otherwise than
as provided in (i) a misdemeanor punishable by one year's imprisonment or $iooo fine, or both.
Subdivision (3) is modified by and must be read in pari materia
with section 303. It grants the court discretion to stay proceedings for
forfeiture and resumption of possession. It makes the granting of a stay
mandatory upon the application of a person in military service unless
it appears that such service has not materially impaired his capacity to
pay or perform except as provided in section 303. The exception provided in section 303 relates to motor vehicles, tractors, and their accessories, and it applies in cases where less than fifty per cent of the purchase price has been paid. Where fifty per cent of the purchase price
has not been paid, no stay can be granted in any action for forfeiture,
foreclosure or repossession. The subdivision, however, confers discretionary power on the court in any case to make such equitable disposition of the matter as will conserve the interests of all parties, and
this power is undiminished by section 303, irrespective of the percentage of the purchase price paid.
"'A brief discussion concerning the addition of this proviso will be found in section IV hereof.
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Section 302 relates to mortgages on real or personal property, including, of course, trust deeds and other security instruments in the
nature of a mortgage. Its application is limited to instances where the
obligation secured originated prior to the date of approval of the act
(October 17, 194o) and then only where the real or personal property
pledged to secure repayment of the obligation was owned by a person
in military service at the time when his military service commenced
and is still so owned by him.
Subdivision (2) is modified by section 303 and must be read in pari
materia therewith. This subdivision empowers the court to stay proceedings for foreclosure against persons in military service where the
capacity of the person to pay is materially impaired by such military
service. On the application of such person and a showing of material
impairment of capacity resulting from military service, a stay is mandatory except as provided in section 303. The exception provided in
section 3o3 as already noted, relates to purchase money chattel mortgages of motor vehicles, tractors and accessories thereof, where less
than fifty per cent of the purchase price has been paid. In any case,
the court is endowed with discretionary power to make such other disposition of the proceeding as may be equitable to preserve the interests
of all parties.
Subdivision (3) provides that sales under a power of sale or under
a judgment entered upon warrant of attorney to confess judgment contained in a mortgage or trust deed, obligations shall be invalid if made
during the period of military service or within three months thereafter.
They are valid only if made upon an order of sale previously granted by
the court and a return thereto made and approved by the court.
Section 303 has already been referred to in previous comments. It
covers motor vehicles, tractors, and the accessories of either. It prohibits the granting of a stay of a proceeding to resume possession or for
an order of sale, unless the court finds that fifty per cent or more of the
purchase price has been paid. In any case, however, the court is given
discretion to require the plaintiff to file a bond conditioned to indemnify the defendant if in the military service, against any loss or damage
he may suffer by reason of such judgment or order should the judgment or order be set aside in whole or in part. It should be noted that
notwithstanding section 3o3, and irrespective of the percentage of the
purchase price paid, the power of the court to deal equitably with any
such proceeding is retained.
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IV-Insurance

The provisions of section IV will not be discussed in detail at this
time, but will be left for subsequent comment. In general, it provides
for the guarantee of premiums on life insurance up to a total insurance
face value of $5,000, whether on one or more policies, where an insured in military service applies for the benefits of the article. The article covers any contract of life insurance on the level premium or
legal reserve plan. It also includes any benefit in the nature of life
insurance arising out of membership in any fraternal or beneficial association. No policy is eligible for guarantee of premiums where there is
an outstanding loan or other indebtedness equal to or greater than
fifty per cent of the cash surrender of the policy. Policies on which
premiums have been unpaid for a period of a year or more are also
ineligible. Where an individual applies for the benefits of the article,
he must send the original of the application, on a form prepared by the
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, to the insurer, and a copy to the
Veterans' Administration. If the Veterans' Administration finds that
the policy is eligible for coverage, and the insurer consents to whatever modifications of the insurance contract are necessary, the United
States Government, in effect, guarantees payment of the necessary
premiums over the period of military service. Thus lapse is prevented
during such service. Certificates of the United States, bearing interest at
a rate to be prescribed from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury are issued to each insurer covering the amount of premiums guaranteed by the Government in each company and in each fraternal or
beneficial association. At the end of one year after the act ceases to be
in force, the accounts between the United States and each insurer are
settled and upon surrender of the certificates by the insurer to the Secretary of the Treasury, payment is made out of any moneys in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated. In order to arrive at the account
stated between the Government and the insurer, the method employed
is this: Each insured is given one year following the termination of his
military service, which under subdivision (2) of section lOl cannot be
later than the date when the act ceases to be in force, during which to
pay to his insurer all past due premiums, that is, those guaranteed by
the Government, together with those which might have been in default at the time of application for coverage. If this is not done, the
policy lapses and becomes void. At this time there is credited to the
United States the total cash surrender value of the policy plus any past
due premiums which the insured might have paid. This credit is offset
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against the face value of the certificates held as security by each insurer.
The difference, if any, is paid by the Government to the insurer. If the
cash surrender value in any instance is greater than the amount of past
due premiums, the over-plus goes to the insured. During the last war,
the loss to the Government was negligible. It aggregated under
$20,000.21

Of further interest generally, is the provision that no contract of
insurance is eligible if it is void or voidable at the option of the insurer, provided the insured is in military service. Contracts of insurance
which provide for the payment of any sum less than the face thereof, or
for the payment of an additional amount as premium in cases where
the insured enters military service, are also ineligible.
E.

ARTICLE

V-Taxes and Public Lands

Sections 5oo and 513 both relate to relief against certain taxes therein described. Section 5oo comprises five subdivisions. The taxes to
which section 5oo is applicable are described in subdivision (1). These
are any taxes or assessments, whether general or special, falling due
during the period of military service in respect to real property. The
real estate affected must be owned and occupied for dwelling, agricultural or business purposes either by a person in military service or by
his dependents. It must have been so owned and occupied either by him
or his dependents at the time of commencement of his military service.
It is further requisite that such real estate be occupied by the person's
dependents or employees when the particular taxes otherwise due are
not paid.
The provisions of subdivision (2) grant a court of competent jurisdiction the power to stay proceedings for the enforcement of collection
of such taxes or assessments and to stay a sale of such property in satisfaction of such unpaid taxes or assessments. A stay may be granted
for a period extending not more than six months beyond termination
of the military service of the person affected. In order to qualify for
such relief, it is necessary that the person in military service file an
affidavit with the tax collector, or with the officer whose duty it is to
enforce the collection of the particular tax or assessment. The requisite
affidavit must show (a) that a tax or assessment has been assessed upon
21During the last World War the Government guaranteed an aggregate of
$362,399.50 in insurance premiums and recovered all but $19,518.40 of the premiums
thus guaranteed. (See Annual Report of Director, United States Veteran's Bureau,
1924, page 445)
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property of the character described in subdivision (i), (b) that the
particular tax or assessment is unpaid and (c) that the deponent is in
military service and that by reason of such service his ability to pay
such tax or assessment is materially affected. Upon the filing of such an
affidavit, no sale.of property within the coverage of this article shall be
made to enforce collection except upon leave of court granted upon
the application of the officer charged with the enforcement and collection. No proceeding or action with a view to sale may be commenced
except upon leave of court following the filing of such an affidavit.
Subdivision (3) makes provision for the instances in which such
property may be sold or forfeited to collect taxes or assessments by
granting the right to redeem or commence an action to redeem the
property following sale. The redemption must be accomplished, or the
action to redeem must be instituted, not later than six months following the termination of the person's military service. By reason of the
provisions of subdivision (2) of section ioi, this may not be later than
six months following the date when the act ceases to be in force. The
six months' redemption period thus granted does not, however, operate to shorten any period which may now or hereafter be provided by
law in any state or territory for such remeption.
Subdivision (4) relates to the accrual of interest on unpaid taxes or
assessments. It provides for interest at the rate of six per cent per annum and precludes the accrual of any other penalty or interest by reason of such nonpayment. Such interest is included in the lien of unpaid
taxes and assessments.
Subdivision (5) is designed to make effective the protection afforded
in this article by requiring the appropriate department heads, that is,
the Secretary of War in the case of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy
in the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps, and the Secretary of the
Treasury in the case of the Coast Guard, to make appropriate provision for the giving of notice to persons under their jurisdiction of
the benefits accorded by the section and of the action made necessary
to enjoy such benefits by persons in military service.
Sections 5ol to 512 inclusive, relate to rights in the public domain, including rights acquired under lode and placer mining claims,
prospecting and exploration permits and leases under the mining and
mineral leasing laws. In general, where the homesteader, permittee,
licensee, lessee, or applicant is absent from the property involved by
reason of military service or does not perform the requisite assessment
work or annual labor, it is provided that his rights will not thereby be
forfeited.

1940]

CIVIL RELIEF ACT

In the case of desert-land entry, under section 504 the time within

which the entryman or claimant is required to make certain expenditures and effect reclamation is extended by the period of military service plus six months, together with any period of hospitalization made
necessary by wounds or other disability incurred in line of duty. While
certain minimum requirements are specified, the general method is to
toll the requirements over the period of military service and up to six
months thereafter, or, in some cases, for the period of enlistment or
service plus any period of hospitalization due to wounds or other disability incurred in line of duty.
Under section 505 placer and lode mining claims are not extinguished through failure to perform the $ioo worth of labor or improvements ordinarily required in each year. The requirements are suspended over the period of the military service plus six months, or over
the period of service together with any period of hospitalization due to
wounds or other disability incurred in line of duty.
Under section 5o6, a permittee or lessee under the Federal mineral
leasing laws may elect to suspend all operations under such permit or
lease for a period of time equivalent to his military service plus six
months. The running of time under the permit or lease is tolled for
that period. It is necessary, however, that within six months following
his entry into the service, the lessee or permittee notify the General
Land Office of his intention to claim the benefits of the section.
Under section 5o8, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized in his
discretion to suspend, over the period while the act remains in force,
with regard to persons in military service, those provisions of the
statute known as the "Reclamation Act", -requiring residence upon
lands in private ownership or within the neighborhood in order to
qualify for securing water for the irrigation of such lands.
Provisions of section 509 direct that the Secretary of the Interior
shall issue through appropriate military and naval channels, for distribution by military and naval authorities to persons in military service, a notice explaining the provisions of Article V.
Under section 51o homestead entrymen are permitted leave of absence from their entries for the purpose of performing farm labor. Time
spent in farm labor is deemed constructive residence on the entry if
within 15 days after leaving his entry he files notice in the district in
which his homestead is situated. Such homestead entrymen who are
not persons in military service are of course not excused from making
improvements or from performing the cultivation upon their entries
required under existing law.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

Section 511 extends to persons under the age of 21 who serve in the
military service while the act remains in force, the same rights under
the laws relating to lands owned or controlled by the United States as
are accorded to persons who have attained majority under present law.
Section 5 12 provides that should the United States become involved
in a war and become allied with any other nation in the prosecution of
that war, citizens of the United States who serve with-such allied forces
shall be entitled to all the relief and benefits afforded by Article V.
This grant is, of course, predicated upon the requirement that the service rendered to the allied country is military service as defined in the
act, that the persons serving be honorably discharged from such service,
and either (1) that they resume United States citizenship or (2) that
they die in the service of the allied forces as the result of such service.
Section 513 relates to all taxes upon the income of any person in the
military service whether falling due prior to or during his period of
service. If it appears that such person's ability to pay such tax is materially impaired by reason of his military service, payment of the tax
may at his election be deferred for a period extending to not more than
six months following the termination of his military service. Neither
interest nor penalty may accrue for the period of deferment. Provision
is made in favor of the Government for the tolling of the statute of
limitations against the collection of the particular tax by distraint or
otherwise. The income tax on employees imposed by section 1400 of
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act 22 is expressly excepted from
the benefits of the section. To the extent that Congress has power to
affect the power of the several states to levy and collect taxes, it is undoubted that the section applies to any excise tax which is levied upon
or measured by the income of the person affected.
F.

ARTICLE

VI-Administrative Remedies

Section 6oo is designed to prevent the use of the act as a sword
rather than as a shield. When any interest in land under a contract is
assigned or transferred for the purpose of claiming the benefits of the
act with intent to delay or defraud the just enforcement of any right,
the benefits of the act become inapplicable. Subdivisions (i) and (2)
of section 6oi provide for the issuance of certificates of record of military service. Under this section The Adjutant General in the case of
the Army, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in the case of the
"Act of Feb. to, 1939, 53 Stat. 14o (Part I)
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Navy, and the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps in the case of the Marine Corps are required upon proper
application therefor to issue a certificate that the person concerning
whom the application is made has not been, or is, or has been, in military service. If the person concerning whom the certificate is requested
has ever been in military service or is now in military service, all pertinent data as to the time, place and length of service, the rank, branch
and unit of the service, the monthly pay received, must be included in
the certificate. In any proceeding under the act, such certificate, when
produced, shall be prima facie evidence as to such facts. It is made the
duty of the officers involved to furnish such certificates upon application. However, since the certificates are for use in "any proceeding
under the Act," it is believed that the policy of the various departments concerned will be to deny a request unless it appears that there
is a bona fide proceeding pending, otherwise the burden involved
would be inestimable. For example, in the War Department alone,
there are over 12,oooooo separate sets of records of military service and

if a search were made upon a frivolous request, the waste of time would
be substantial and damaging to the efficiency of the office affected.
Subdivision (3) of section 6oi relates to persons in military service
who have been reported missing. It provides that until such person has
been accounted for, he shall be presumed to be in the service. It further directs that no period limited in the act which begins or ends with
the death of such persons shall begin or end until the death of such
person is in fact reported to or found by the Department of War or
Navy, or any court or board thereof, or until such death is found by a
court of competent jurisdiction. It is further provided that the provisions of the section cannot operate to extend a period otherwise limited by the death of such person for a period beyond six months after
the time when the act ceases to be in force.
Section 6o2 refers to interlocutory orders made under the provisions of the act by any court. It is provided that such court upon its own
motion or otherwise, may revoke, modify or extend such order upon
such notice to the parties affected as the court may require.
Section 603 is the separability clause. It provides: "If any provision
of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances,
is held invalid, the remainder of the act, and the application of such
provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby."
Section 604 provides that the act shall remain in force until May 15,
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1945. A proviso is appended, however, to the effect that should the
United States be then engaged itt a war, the act continues in force for
a period of six months following the termination of such war by a
treaty of peace proclaimed by the President. A second proviso of importance is also attached. It is to the effect that wherever under any section
of the act a proceeding, remedy, privilege, stay, limitation, accounting,
or other transaction has been authorized or provided with respect to
military service performed prior to the date fixed for the termination
of the act, the applicable section shall be deemed to continue in force
for so long as may be necessary to the full exercise and enjoyment of
such proceedings, etc.
Section 605 is designed to operate as a repeal clause in respect of the
provisions of section 4 of the National Guard law and the provisions of
section 13 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.23 It is
23Act of August 27, 1940 (Public Resolution No. 96, 76th Cong.)

phrased so as to make the cited sections of law inapplicable with respect
to any military service performed following October 17, 1940. However,
any rights which attached under the cited sections prior to October 17,
1940, are clearly preserved.

24

III. THE GENERAL METHOD OF THE STATUTE

The act confers wide discretionary powers on all courts in which
actions may be commenced to grant a stay at any stage of such proceeding or action where it is commenced either by or against a soldier
or sailor and irrespective of the subject matter of the action. These
powers may be exercised in the discretion of the court on its own
motion or upon application thereto. It is not contemplated that any
hindrance be placed in the way of the commencement of actions against
soldiers and sailors. On the contrary it will be noted that the general
method of the act is such that summary proceedings ordinarily exercised by persons such as conditional vendors, chattel mortgagees, landlords and tax collectors (depending upon the laws of each particular
2

1A rather unusual method employed was to render it perfectly clear that the
repeal was not to be retroactive from October 17, 1940. Since no one was inducted
into military service prior to October 17, 1940, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940 will govern exclusively as to selectees. As to personnel ordered to active
duty under the authority of Public Res. No. 96, 76th Congress, approved August 27,

194o, between August 27 and October 17, 1940, the provisions of the 1918 relief act

(40 Stat. 44 o) as revived and extended by section 4 of the Resolution will govern only
where a creditor between those dates filed suit against a person so ordered to duty.
In such case the 1918 act, as so revived will govern. In all other cases, the 194 o act will
control. (Articles IV and V of the 1918 law were not revived by the Resolution.)
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state) may not be pursued. They may be exercised only upon application to a court. Thus, each case is brought within the contemplation
and jurisdiction of the proper court. During the Civil War, legislation
whereby provision was made conferring upon all persons in military
service a sweeping exemption from the service of process was the order
of the day. The act is a definite departure from that method. In requiring the creditor to exercise all summary remedies only by leave of court
the rights of a person in military service are, upon a proper showing,
preserved intact for the time being.
The central theory of the act is such that (excluding, of course, the
provisions of Article IV, relating to life insurance and those provisions
of Article V relating to public lands) no relief is afforded, nor any benefit extended, unless the individual affected makes a showing that his
ability to pay or perform is materially impaired by reason of military
service. If those whose ability to pay or perform remains unaffected notwithstanding military service were automatically granted a stay against
the necessity of responding to their obligations, a serious dislocation of
economy might ensue.
In most instances, the court is given a wide latitude of discretion to
enter such order as will equitably conserve and protect the interests of
all parties. As a condition precedent to the granting of the stay, the
court, for example, may require that the person in military service, if
able, make some small payment on the obligation involved. So far as
possible, the objective is to preserve the status quo. Manifestly, the act
is not of itself a moratorium upon the obligations of persons in military service. No ipso facto absolution is accorded. Reposing confidence
in the courts of the nation, it is left to them largely to do equity in each
case as it arises. In no instance is anyone relieved from his obligations,
but upon a proper showing, the time for performance or the time when
enforcement may be effected is deferred until the soldier or sailor may
return to his own community and attempt to take such steps as are
available to him to pick up the threads of his civilian pursuits and meet
his commitments.
Further to insure an opportunity to present a defense, reasonable
provision for the setting aside, vacation, or reopening of judgments
and decrees is made. However, in any instance, a showing must be presented before such relief will be extended. It must appear that the individual had a meritorious defense which he was prevented from interposing by reason of his service. Moreover, elasticity is insured in that
any interlocutory order may be modified by the court to meet chang-
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ing conditions and new developments. For example, where a court has
granted a stay on condition that a soldier pay certain installments on
the obligation concerned, it might subsequently develop that he will
become less able to comply with such order. It would then be just and
equitable to modify the order or vary it in some way. Section 6o2 makes
provision for this contingency.
The subjects of partnership, bankruptcy proceedings and trusts are
omitted from the enactment. However, the discretion granted in the
act to stay all proceedings of any nature is doubtless sufficiently broad
to cover most special cases. For example, in a proceeding for the dissolution of a partnership or in a bankruptcy proceeding, the court has
plenary power to stay the action if it is adverse to the soldier or sailor,
where it appears that his capacity to defend is impaired by reason of
his military service. Of course in the matter of probate proceedings and
trusts, it would be difficult to treat of these fields of law separately
without interfering with the administration of rights involved in all
decedents' estates.
Under the provisions of section 202, relief against the accrual of
penalties is afforded. Thus, for example, where under a contract to pay
a certain sum it is provided that upon default in any installment the
creditor at his option may declare the whole sum due, the court is
empowered to relieve against such a penalty if it appears that the
capacity of the individual to pay was impaired by reason of his military
service. In the case of a person purchasing real estate under one of the
several current mortgage plans at a favorable interest rate and with
long amortization of principal, where he is rendered unable to meet
the installments by reason of his military service he does not necessarily face, upon his return to civil life, the prospect of having to pay
the entire balance, or the hazard of refinancing on less favorable terms.
Under section 202 plenary power is accorded to the courts to relieve
against such a penalty, provided the person was in the service when
the penalty was incurred and makes the proper showing.
Provision is also made to avoid wherever possible the total suspension of legal proceedings. This is accomplished by providing that
if in any manner the court learns that the defendant who is not represented in a proceeding is a soldier or sailor, an attorney may be appointed to represent him and protect his interests. While such attorney may not waive any of the rights of the person in the military service whom he represents, nevertheless in such cases where the court feels
justified on the particular facts, it may proceed to a hearing in the de-
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fendant's absence. In according power to impose terms upon the granting of a stay,'a new practice is injected. The courts in the United States
have seldom made their judgments payable by installments. However, it
is obvious that this is an exceedingly beneficial jurisdiction.
An important provision is the proviso carried in subdivision (i) of
section 3oi. In view of the fact that subdivision (2) of that section
makes criminal the resumption of possession in cases of contracts of
conditional sale, other than as provided in section 301 (1), it was felt
by the Congress that a large number of vendors would be afraid to explore the possibilities of genuine cooperation between vendor and
vendee. Although section 3ol (i) apart from the proviso does not preclude the parties from disposing of their differences in any mutually
agreeable manner, yet during pendency of the legislation a large number of persons expressed the view that because of the penalty section, a
vendor might hesitate to come to an equitable settlement with his vendee out of court. Therefore, the proviso was added. It was, however,
fettered with the condition that a contract in modification, alteration,
or rescission of an existing contract of conditional sale be in writing
and that it be executed subsequent to the date when the original contract was made and after the commencement of the military service of
the vendee. Thus the vendee is protected from the threatening pressure
of an unscrupulous vendor who tries to force him to give up his equity
under an existing contract in contemplation of pending selection for
military service. On the other hand, the equitable disposition of cases
by mutual agreement is encouraged. It is probable that in a majority of
cases, the persons concerned will cooperate in good faith and thereby
eliminate the necessity of court proceedings. Where a vendor is, however, unscrupulous, a vendee is (if his contract was executed and an installment was paid prior to October 17, 1940) protected because in such

instances, it is necessary that the vendor make application to a court for
repossession of the chattel involved. The court is empowered to stay the
forfeiture where the person in military service is unable to pay.
The act in Article III establishes a distinction between the two general types of security transactions. Section 3oi refers to contracts for the
purchase of real or personal property and to contracts of lease or bailment with a view to the purchase of such property. It applies in all
cases where a person or his assignor has received a deposit or installment of the purchase price from any person or from such person as assignor (if prior to October 17, 1940), and the payer of the installment

or deposit enters military service after the date when such deposit or in-
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stallment was paid. The net effect of the section is to require the party
who receives such deposit or installment or the assignee of such party, to
institute action in court for the exercise under his contract of any right
or option to rescind or terminate it or to resume possession of the property involved. The payee of the deposit or installment or his assignee is
prohibited from proceeding to exercise any contractual right of forfeiture out of court.
On the other hand, section 302 applies to obligations secured by a
mortgage, trust deed or other security in the nature of a mortgage on
real or personal property where such real or personal property was
owned by a person at the time of the commencement of his military
service and where such property is still so owned by him. A reading of
sections 301 and 302 might lead to the conclusion that a hiatus has
been left in the protection afforded by the statute. This appears to be
the case because section 302 does not expressly require a mortgagee or
his assignee to foreclose his mortgage in court. Subdivision (2) of section 302 provides that "In any proceeding commenced in any court
during the period of military service to enforce such obligation," the
proceedings may be stayed or the court may make such disposition of
the case as may be equitable. Bearing in mind that no conditional
vendor or his assignee under subdivision (i) of section 301 may exercise any right granted by the contract to declare a forfeiture "except by
action in a court of competent jurisdiction" the question will naturally
arise as to what protection a soldier or sailor is given in cases where,
under the laws of a particular state, a chattel mortgage may be foreclosed without court action. It nowhere appears that such a method of
foreclosure is proscribed. While subdivision (3) of section 302 renders
invalid a sale under a power of sale or under a judgment entered upon
warrant of attorney to confess judgment, if made during the period of
the mortgagor's military service or within three months thereafter, unless upon an order of sale provisionally granted by the court, foreclosure
by summary process is not treated expressly. In other words, where a
particular state requires or directs that chattel mortgages be foreclosed
in a judicial proceeding, the action, of course, must be instituted in a
court of competent jurisdiction before any foreclosure of the mortgagor's rights can ensue. Similarly, by reason of the express provisions of
subdivision (3) of section 302 where the mortgage contract itself confers a power of sale or a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, the
mortgage must apply to the court in order validly to accomplish such
a sale. In that case, of course, the action is cognizable by a court of com-
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petent jurisdiction and the court may of its own motion or upon application to it enter such an order as may be equitable, to protect the
soldier's interest during the period of his service. However, nothing is
expressly provided with regard to foreclosure in states where the
method of foreclosure is by summary remedy and without judicial
process. There is no express provision contained anywhere in the statute whereby a mortgagee in such a state is required to apply to any
court in order to exercise that remedy of foreclosure.
It has already been held that a purchase money chattel mortgage
is not a contract for the purchase of property. On this authority, summary foreclosures would not come within the meaning of section 301.25
Without discussing whether any court might adopt the view that a
purchase money chattel mortgage is a contract within the meaning of
section 3o, it is believed that, notwithstanding the apparent omission
in the statute regarding foreclosures by summary process, in the states
where such procedure is authorized, since the mortgagor or his assignor
must be given notice of the institution of the summary proceedings in
one way or another, the right to obtain relief is nevertheless fully enjoyed. Reference is made to a subdivision (2) of section 102 providing
that "when under this Act any application is required to be made to a
court in which no proceeding has already been commenced with respect to the matter, such application may be made to any court." In
cases where a given state permits foreclosure by summary process the
person in military service need only apply to the court for a stay or for
such other order as may in the premises be deemed equitable by the
court. The proceedings then fall within the cognizance of the court and
it becomes a proceeding to enforce a mortgage obligation even though
the applicant is the defendant. If this procedure is not indicated, the
mortgagor may always apply for a temporary restraining order and for
an injunction pendente lite, to present any defense, and thus transfer
the summary foreclosure to court. Upon so doing, of course, the nature
of the proceeding is precisely similar to that described in section 302 (1)
26
and the benefits of the act may be invoked.
It becomes apparent then that the method of the act with regard to
rents, installments, contracts and mortgages is such that no landlord,
vendor or mortgagee can proceed to enforce his summary remedy except by action in court. This is subject to the modification already dis,
2"Bassham v. Evans, 216 S. W. 446, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
-"Elder v. Massachusetts Mortgage Co., 159 Wash. 450, 293 Pac. 711 (193o), 85
A. L. R. 638 (1933); Western Machinery Exchange v. Gray's Harbor County, 19o
Wash. 447, 68 P. (2d) 613 (1937).
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cussed as to chattel mortgages in states where foreclosure is by summary process. However, in the case of a purchase money chattel mortgage it would be unsafe for a mortgagee or his assignee to proceed with
summary foreclosure in such a state, in view of the possibility that such
a contract would be construed to fall within section 3oi. A rather severe
penalty is provided in subdivision (2) of section 301 for exercising any
rights under a contract to forfeit except by application to a court. The
purchase money chattel mortgage and the conditional sales contract
perform identical functions in trade and commerce today. By its very
name the purchase money chattel mortgage strongly suggests that it
should be regarded as a contract for the purchase of personal property.
In the opinion of the writer there is no logical or compelling basis for
the conclusion that a purchase money chattel mortgage is not a contract
27
within the meaning of subdivision (1) of section 3o, the Evans case
to the contrary notwithstanding. There is some reason for concluding
that a purchase money chattel mortgage stands on the same footing
28
within the contemplation of the act as a conditional sales contract.
All installment sellers, lending institutions, including automobile
finance companies, etc., are left unaffected by the act as to sales made
subsequent to October 17, 1940, the date on which the act was approved. This is so, except in a limited sense, even if the installment
purchaser, in whatever of several ways the installment purchase is effected, subsequently enters or is inducted into military service. However, the general relief accorded by Article II is not restricted in point
of time to matters arising prior to the date of the approval of the act.
Therefore in any instance where a creditor does enter court in quest
of his remedy against a debtor who has entered military service the act
may supervene, notwithstanding the transaction occurred subsequent to
October 17, 194o. This is so because section 203 is general in its terms.
It provides that "In any action or proceeding commenced in any court
against a person in military service, before or during the period of such
service, or within sixty days thereafter," the court may stay the execution of any judgment or order entered against such person or it may
vacate or stay any attachment or garnishment. Moreover section 201
provides that "At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any
court in which a person in military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant," the court may in its discretion grant a stay; and it
-Bassham v. Evans, 216 S. W. 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
2SSec. 3o3 Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. This section accords the
same treatment to both types of installment purchases so far as automobiles, tractors

and their accessories are concerned.
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must, on application, grant such a stay where a showing is made that
the ability of the plaintiff to prosecute the action, or of the defendant
to conduct his defense, is materially affected by reason of his military
service. Furthermore, subdivision (I) of section 200 is also general in
its terms. It provides that in any proceeding or action, commenced in
any court where there is a default of appearance, the plaintiff is similarly fettered and the defendant soldier or sailor similarly protected.
Thus, with the possible exception of instances where state law permits
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage without court process, that is to say
by summary remedy, and of cases where under a contract of conditional
sale or other method of installment purchase executed after October
17, 1940, forfeiture and repossession may be accomplished out of court,

the entry of a stay order is authorized. This would follow, despite the
fact that the mortgage was executed after October 17, 194o, because

while section 302 contains a recitation that "the provisions of this section shall apply only to obligations originating prior to the date of the
approval of this Act," none of the sections in Article II is so limited.
Thus, the method of the act is such that transactions must be accomplished with a view to the possibility of delay in the realization of a
-remedy,irrespective of the date of the transaction.
IV. A

CRITICAL APPRAISEMENT

No attempt will be made in this section to cover the entire field
wherein the relief of persons or the relief of dependents of persons who
are selected for induction into the military service is indicated. It is, of
course, manifest that the selectee may suffer a complete dislocation of
his economic situation. He and his dependents, although it may fall
upon them by lot, admittedly share the brunt of the burden of national
defense. Those who by operation of the doctrine of chance are not inducted and those who by reason of physical disability, age or other circumstances are exempted from so serving, do not in any measure suffer
a similar impact. It is, therefore, patent that a wide distribution of this
burden is not only equitable but necessary to the continued morale of
the citizens of the nation and to the maintainance of a sound national
defense. As a consequence, the scope of this subject is one of extreme
breadth and may not be treated with any justice within the limitations
of an article of this nature. This appraisement will, therefore, be limited in scope strictly to those matters which the Congress undertook to
touch and affect by the statute, and to a discussion of the effectiveness
and soundness of the method pursued with regard to those subjects.
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In the opinion of the writer, the most important article in the
statute is Article III. Of course, the act would be empty without Article
II, but from the standpoint of the number of cases and situations affected Article III is to be regarded as of cardinal importance to the
prospective selectee and volunteer. This is so because of the tremendous volume of business done on the installment plan. In view of this
fact, just how soundly and effectively has the Congress treated the subject of installment contracts?
It is believed by some that Article III is wanting, not only in scope
but also in design. Predicated as it is upon the antecedent World War
enactment, 29 they contend that it has not been revised to meet the striking metamorphosis in business occurring since that war.
While it has already been suggested that there is no logical reason
for regarding a purchase money chattel mortgage as other than a contract for the purchase of personal property, yet in view of the mentioned possibility that such a conclusion may be generally adopted, the
approach to the problem might have been made with closer regard to
the nature of each transaction involved.
Transactions affecting chattels could have been combined in one
class, that is to say, all contracts involving installment purchases of
personal property, whether by the device of purchase money chattel
mortgage, conditional sales contract or of lease or bailment with a view
to the purchase of such property, could have been placed in one category. All contracts for the installment purchase of real property, whether by contract of conditional sale or purchase money mortgage or otherwise, could have been placed in a second category. All true loans secured by a mortgage or other security device on chattels could have
been separately classified, and as a fourth category, all loans secured by
a mortgage, trust deed or other security in the nature of a real estate
mortgage could have been separately classified.
In the case of installment purchases by whatever method or device,
the statute could have expressly provided against pursuit of a summary
remedy out of court against a defaulting purchaser. In this manner the
uncertainty in this respect would have been obviated. In a majority of
instances chattels are subject to rapid depreciation. Where an insubstantial proportion of the purchase price of a given article being purchased on the installment plan has been paid at the time when an individual enters military service, it may seem unfair to require that the
vendor await the passage of a year or fifteen months, while the chattel
24o Stat. 440.
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is depreciating and his security is perhaps being wholly extinguished
before he can repossess. In this class of cases, the court might have been
empowered to order a return of an equitable portion of the purchase
price in all instances as a condition precedent to repossession. In that
case its power to grant a stay in a forfeiture proceeding might have been
limited to those instances where a reasonably substantial proportion of
the purchase price has been paid.
Of course, section 303 of Article III which concerns motor vehicles,
tractors and their accessories, is designed to accomplished this for the
particular items mentioned, but the merchant who sells a radio, a
washing machine, or a refrigerator, is subject to the same risks as an
automobile dealer. It has been suggested that there is no sound reason
for this distinction. Moreover the claim is made that it is unreasonable
to permit the possibility of foreclosure without court action in some
cases and not in others on the mere chance that a particular state authorizes chattel mortgage foreclosures by summary process. No one
can deny that uniformity should be insured and that this matter should
not have been left to speculation.
It will readily be admitted that the character of real estate is such
that it occupies a totally different position from that occupied by chattels generally. Real estate does not ordinarily depreciate as rapidly. It
may not be removed and whether the device employed for the installment purchase of real estate is one of conditional sale or purchase.
money mortgage makes very little difference. Generally the same kind
and measure of relief should be accorded. The most natural and logical kind of relief is to subject the vendor to a delay in pursuing his
remedy for the period of the purchaser's inilitary service and for a
reasonable time thereafter. Moreover the purchaser should not, in the
average case, suffer loss of his right to take up the balance of installments following his return to civilian life. Section 202 of Article II
authorizes courts generally to relieve against a fine or penalty provided
in any contract as a result of non-performance. Therefore, in a proper
case this portion of the relief has been made available. The point is
made by some that the classification of installment purchase contracts
on both real and personal property together is unsound for the reasons
already stated.
Some contend that real estate loans should have been distinguished
from chattel loans. They further suggest that true loans should have
been treated separately from purchase money transactions.
The position taken by some who consider that the choice of means
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was not wholly appropriate may be stated as follows: "In the case of
chattel loans, it is inequitable completely to tie the hands of the lender
for a year or fifteen months while the chattel rapidly depreciates before
he can consummate his remedy. Both parties must be protected and
there is but one equitable means to accomplish this. Since the equities
of each case vary, the broadest discretionary powers should be accorded
to a court to enter such orders as will conserve the-interests of both
parties. A stay should never be mandatory unless a substantial portion
of the loan has been repaid. The lender should never be permitted to
pursue a summary remedy out of court. Where an insubstantial portion
of the loan has been repaid and the chattel is one of a rapidly depreciating nature, the matter should be treated in the same manner as has
already been suggested in the case of installment purchase contracts.
Another method would be to have the chattel appraised by disinterested
parties appointed by the court and to require the lender, as an alternative to foreclosure, to pay the borrower a reasonable sum in discharge
of the borrower's equity and of his obligation, pass title to the lender,
leaving him to the realization of whatever the chattel will bring in liquidation of the outstanding loan.
"In the case of true loans secured by real estate, broad discretionary powers should be accorded to the courts to enter any order calculated to conserve the interests of all the parties. Because of the inherent nature of real estate the entry of a stay order is normally not
inequitable. Upon the return of the person in military service to civilian status he should be accorded the opportunity of continuing the installment repayment of the loan on a reasonable basis. Of course, as
to acceleration clauses, section 202 of Article II grants the court the
power to relieve against a penalty such as the acceleration of maturity
for default in repayment of any installments.
"The restrictions contained in sections 301 and 302 as to what obligations and transactions are covered is probably the weakest feature
of the act." Within the limitations of this article it would be impracticable to set forth the complete history surrounding the insertion of
these limitations. However, a brief resume of the background will
serve to make plain the reasons therefor.
Primarily because of the fact that each class of transactions was
not treated separately, a great deal of rather groundless fear arose in
the minds of many persons connected with lending, automobile financing and other related enterprises. These fears were transmitted to the
Congress at the several hearings held on the measure when it was
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pending in committee. It was threatened that should the Congress fail
to insert in section 302 the provision that the section would apply "only
to obligations originating prior to the date of the approval of the Act,"
the potential credit of all males between the ages of 2 1 and 36 would be
frozen. This was based upon the suggestion that it would be impossible
to determine from time to time just who would and who would not be
selected for induction into the military service. As a consequence, representatives of many lending institutions took the position that a substantial dislocation of national economy would ensue, that a great hardship would be cast upon all potential selectees and that as a practical
matter, there was no point in providing protection in a field of business which would become nonexistent. This danger was particularly
emphasized with regard to automobile loans. However, it was greatly
magnified and doubtless resulted from a failure on the part of the
lenders fully to analyze the problem, together with the fact that Congress did not treat separately the various classes of transactions covered
by Article III.
Between rendering it less safe for a lender to lend and unsafe for a
borrower to borrow, it has been urged that there is no real difference.
Theoretically the result would appear to be identical. That is to say,
credit transactions would ostensibly cease. In practice, however, the
identity of result does not follow. The effect on credit transactions is
more serious in relegating the borrower to borrow at his peril than it is
where the risk in lending has been enhanced. This is basically so because
the merchant and the banker may take steps to insure against a consequent loss in this particular field of his business. No one could reasonably suggest that the burden of military service should fall upon any
one person or upon any particular group of persons. It should be evenly
distributed so far as possible. By increasing interest rates to a limited
extent, insurance against consequent loss could be provided in each
case. If all persons beyond the age limits of the Selective Service Act
were required to pay a slightly higher interest rate, the monies so
realized, together with the sums realized from the potential selectee
class, could adequately offset the loss, and the burden would be more
evenly distributed.
For example, in one instance presented to the writer by a banker
who felt that he would have been compelled to cease lending to potential selectees if the limitation had not been inserted, the following appeared. His bank had approximately gooo pending automobile loans.
Of these loans, 3ooo were owned by persons between the ages of 2 1 and
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36. Under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, it is provided that, except in time of war, there shall not be in active training
and service "more than 9oo,ooo men inducted under the provisions of
the Act."' 0 Moreover, the act further provides that the President may
not induct any greater number of men "than the Congress shall hereafter make specific appropriation for from time to time." 3' There are
approximately 16,ooo,ooo persons between the ages.of 21 to 36, subject to registration. Therefore, in time of peace not more than six per
cent of the total may be inducted in any one year. As a consequence, in
the example case, not over six per cent of the automobile loans of this
bank outstanding in the selective service age group could reasonably be
affected in any one year. Stated otherwise, not over six per cent of 3,ooo,
or 18o loans out of a total of 9,00o loans, would normally be affected
by the operation of the Selective Service Act. The banker admitted that
probably not more than 25 per cent of those selected would take an unreasonable attitude or fail to co-operate, and not over 25 per cent would
be rendered less able to complete and perform their obligations. Assuming that 50 per cent of these borrowers would be unable to perform or would attempt to repudiate their obligations, not over onehalf or 90 of such loans would become "duds". Even if a stay were
granted for a year or fifteen months, some realization could be made
from the chattel. But assuming the worst, that the loan would become a total loss, this would constitute but one per cent per year of the
total loans in this classification (900o). The banker involved stated
that present interest rates are predicated upon an annual loss of one
half of one per cent. By increasing interest rates in this classification by
one per cent not only on loans to persons between the ages of 21 and
36 but also on loans to persons of greater age, the consequent increase
in revenue thus provided would more than adequately insure against
and offset any losses within reason.
It is probable that the threat of frozen credit was based upon a failure to analyze the true situation. The Congress, however, adopted the
view that a real possibility of frozen credit existed if the limiting words
were not inserted in the act, and although no request was made therefor
so far as the record discloses, a similar limitation was placed in section
3o with respect to installment sales. Thus, in the attempt to provide
relief in an important field to all potential selectees, the net result in
practical fact is that only those inducted during the current year who
3OSection 3 (a) of the Act. Public No. 783,
s"Section 6 of the Act, supra.

7 6th

Congress, approved Sept. 16, 1940.
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had incurred obligations of this nature prior to October 17, 1940 will
be accorded any relief whatsoever. Therefore, the man who as a potential selectee faces induction some two, three or four years hence has
no protection and is left from day to day in a position of great uncertainty. He has no means of self insurance. He can only stand one
"strike," whereas the lender or the merchant has available means to provide some reasonable self insurance upon a basis whereby the creditor,
the borrower older than 36 years, and the potential selectee all share in,
the burden.
One of the chief reasons why the bankers and the financial institutions threatened the freezing of credit was because of the failure to
treat separately the various classes of transactions described above.
What the financial institutions most feared was that where, in case of
an automobile loan or other type of loan, a small down payment had
been received, and the borrower was thereafter selected for induction,
the lender would be unable to realize any remedy for a year or fifteen.
months. Over this waiting period the motor vehicle would, of course,
rapidly depreciate, not only through use but through the running of
time. Had the Congress classified these transactions and treated them
separately as indicated above, the threat of frozen crdeit would doubtless not have been made. In all justice to the bankers and banking institutions, it should be stated that they were not unwilling to accept a
part of the burden; and under the circumstances and due to their failure through lack of time to carefully analyze the situation, it is understandable that the threat was made. The time limitation was inserted
by the Congress solely because it was honestly feared that credit would
32
be frozen.
A minor omission of no great importance occurs in section 6oi.
That section establishes as prima facie evidence of certain facts a certificate signed by The Adjutant General of the Army as to persons in
the Army, by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation as to persons in
the United States Navy, "or in any other branch of the United States
service while serving pursuant to law with the United States Navy"
anCongressional Record, Senate, September 3o, 1940, p. 19364. "Mr. Gurney: * * *
In reference to S.4270, section 3oi, division i, * * * it is suggested that the clause
'originating prior to the date of the approval of this Act' *
be reinstated in this
section. * * *
"The elimination of these words will cause a hardship to those persons who are
in military service or who are to be called in because it will freeze their credits. * * *
"It is obvious that no lending agency will allow a possible draftee to borrow
money on a chattel * * * unless he [the lender] has a protection that the words
that have been deleted from this section will give [if restored] * * *."

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I I

and by The Major General Commandant, United States Marine Corps
as to persons in the Marine Corps, etc. Under section ioi the members
of the Coast Guard are expressly covered by the Act. The Coast Guard
is at present under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. In
time of war the President is empowered to declare an emergency and
place it under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. If such a
thing were done, then the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation should
issue certificates of this nature to cover members of the Coast Guard. At
the present time, however, he has no jurisdiction to do so because the
Coast Guard is not now serving pursuant to law with the Navy. This
is, of course, of minor importance because the Coast Guard has no reserve component as such and because with regard to the matters covered
by Articles II and III it would be difficult to conceive of a circumstance
wherein a member of the Coast Guard would be entitled to any relief.
This is true because it is improbable that any showing could be made
that service in the Coast Guard today or next month or next year renders a person serving any less able to perform his obligations than he
was before the passage of the act or at any other time, assuming, of
course, that as a professional sailor he was in the Coast Guard when the
obligation was incurred. Due to this there will be relatively few cases
arising at present as to Coast Guard members. Moreover, it is not essential to the enjoyment of any provision of the Act that such a certificate
be procured.
V.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Considerable attention was devoted to the question of constitutionality, while the antecedent World War enactment was under consideration by the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of
Representatives. 33 The same general considerations are before us now.
The Federal Constitution (Art. I, sec. 8) provides that:
"The Congress shall have Power To * * * provide for the

common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; * * *
To raise and support armies * * * to provide and maintain a

navy * * * To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions * * * To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers * *
13Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 65th
Congress, 1st Session, on H. R. 611o, September 21, 1917. Hearings and memoranda
before theSubcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 65 th Congress, ist
session and 2nd Session on S. 2859 and H. R. 6361, September 14, 22, and 25, 1917 and

January 18, 1918. See pages 16o-t67, inc., of Senate Hearings and Memoranda; see
H. Rept. 181, 65 th Congress, 2nd session.
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It is a grant, the scope of which is limited only by the words themselves. It is limited only as to the manner of exercise.3 4 Any legislation
which is conducive, convenient or appropriate to these purposes and
which is not specifically prohibited by the Constitution is authorized
thereby. Congress may exercise its judgment in the selection of the
means and is not limited to those only which are indispensable or absolutely necessary. The foregoing principle of constitutional construction was originally announced by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of
McCulloch v. Maiyland.35 In that case the Court said:
"But we think the sound construction of the Constitution
must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the
high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but
consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
Under the provisions of the Act, 36 the enforcement of creditors'
remedies against debtors in military service is delayed in a proper case.
Where it appears that the capacity of an individual to meet his obligations has been impaired by reason of his military service, the courts
are endowed with discretionary power to stay his creditor's hand for as
long as the period of his military service and up to three months thereafter. The objective is to stimulate and sustain the morale of persons
entering military service, thereby the better to provide for the common
defense. It is generally conceded that the stimulation and preservation
of morale is an essential ingredient of an effective national defense.
Moreover, few will claim that a debtor, harrassed by his creditors, is
normally imbued with an appreciable degree of morale. This discussion, therefore, will proceed on the assumption that where morale is
not safeguarded, the efficacy of the national defense is imperiled; that
the granting of respite to debtor-soldiers during their military service
in instances where such service has impaired their capacity to respond
to antecedent committments is conducive to the stimulation and preservation of morale.
mArt. I, § 9, Cl. 2-8 incl. Amendments I to X inc., Fed. Const.
'4 Wheat. 36 (U. S. i819).
3'Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o, Act of October 17, 1940 Public
No. 86x, 76th Congress.
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It has been suggested that the method of the subject enactment is
such that a deprivation of property without due process of law or a
taking of private property without just compensation will result; that
therefore the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is contravened. It will not be denied that private contractual relations are affected by the enactment, and that valuable existing remedial rights are
materially altered, in that their availability is deferred or their exercise
made conditional.
In respect of the constitutionality of such provisions, the principal
questions presented are these:
(i) What is the constitutional warrant for such an enactment?
(2) Is there a deprivation or a taking of private property in violation of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment?
The ensuing discussion deals with these questions jointly, for they
are too closely related to admit of separate treatment without considerable repetition.
While the Constitution expressly prohibits the several states from
passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, there is no provision of the Constitution similarly restraining Congress.3 7 The substance of the cases on the question is to the effect that while Congress
may not appropriate private property for the public use without making just compensation therefor, there is no prohibition against congressional action impairing the obligations of contracts.
Even the states, which are specifically forbidden to impair the obligations of contracts,3 8 may interfere with or abrogate existing contracts in the exercise of sovereign powers. Laws prohibiting lotteries,
the sale of intoxicating liquors, or the maintenance of nuisances, zoning
laws, laws regulating rates and services of utilities, and numerous other
enactments, may all have the effect of destroying contracts, but they are
40
none the less valid.39 In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,
3'Art. I, § to, CI. t, Fed. Const. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870);
Mitchell v. Clark, iio U. S. 633 (1883); Waignt v. Bank of Roanoke, 30o U. S. 44o
'937); Gold Clause Cases, 294 U. S. 317, 330 (1935).
MArt. I, § 1o, Fed. Const.
'Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 692 (1897); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 48o (1905) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1913); Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S.
67, 76-77 (1915); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S. 372, 376
(ig9); Producers Transp. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of California, 251 U. S. 228, 232
(1920); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (1922); Sutter Butte Canal Co. v.
Railroad ComM., 279 U. S. 125, 138 (1929); Stephenson v. Binford, 287, U. S. 251, 276
(1932) ; St. Paul Fire 8 Marine Ins. Co. v. Eldracher, 33 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929), cert. den., 280 U. S.604 (1929).
0290 U. S.398, 435 (1934)-
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Mr. Chief Justice Hughes thus summarized this power of the states to
affect existing contracts:
"Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to
fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts
as a postulate of the legal order. * * "
In the Blaisdell case, 41 a statute of the State of Minnesota was
under consideration. The enactment authorized the district courts of
that state upon application of a mortgagor or his successor in interest,
to extend the period of redemption in connection with foreclosure
sales "for such additional time as the court may deem just and equitable, but in no event beyond May 1, 1935"; to "withhold deficiency
judgments for a like period and to substitute judicial sales for the sales
by advertisement stipulated in mortgages.''42 The Minnesota Court
held that "the present economic emergency justifies the use of police
power to effect a change or temporary postponement of the mortgagee's
remedy, even though there results an impairment of the obligation of
the mortgage contract." 43 On an appeal from the judgment of the
state court the United States Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute, denied that there was an impairment and concluded that the act was justified as an exercise of the
state's reserved power in a public emergency,.
Even greater power, it has been suggested, is granted to Congress to
affect contracts, since there is no prohibition in the Constitution
44
against impairment by the national legislature.
45
In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. the United States Supreme Court considered the War-Time Prohibition Act,46 approved
ten days after the armistice with Germany was signed. It was there
contended that while the Congress might have the implied power, if
reasonably necessary, to forbid the sale of liquor in order to guard and
promote the efficiency of the men composing the Army and Navy and
of the workers engaged in supplying them with arms, munitions, trans41290 U. S. 398 (1934)-

"2Minn. Laws (1933) C. 339.
"Blaisdell v. Home Building and Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334
(1933), aff'd., 189 Minn. 448, 249 N. W. 893 (1933). Affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934)"Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 550 (U. S. 1870) ; Mitchell v. Clark, i io U. S.
633 (1883); Evans-Snider-Bud Co. v. McFadden, 1o5 Fed. 293, 297 (C. C. A. 5 th,
i9oo); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 264 Fed. 138, 152 (E. D. Mo.
1920).
"251 U. S. 146 (1919).

"Act of Nov. 21, 1918, 40 Stat. 1o46.
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portation, and supplies, it could not thereby appropriate private property without just compensation. It was argued that the net result of the
legislation was to restrict the sale and disposition of liquor stocks on
hand; that this constituted taking property without just compensation. In upholding the act, however, the Court said:
"* * * The War-Time Prohibition Act fixed a period of seven

months and nine days from its passage during which liquors
could be disposed of free from any restriction imposed by the
Federal Government. Thereafter, until the end of the war and
the termination of demobilization, it permits unrestricted sale
for export and, within the United States, sales for other than
beverage purposes. The uncompensated restriction upon the disposition of liquors imposed by this act is of a nature far less
severe than the restrictions upon the use of property acquired
before the enactment of the prohibitory law[s which were held to
be permissible in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 668; Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U. S. 1, 23. * * *"

In the case of Wright v. Vinton Branch47 it was contended that section 75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended June 28, 1934,48 popularly cited as the New Frazier-Lemke Act, which offered distressed
farmers means of rehabilitation under the bankruptcy clause, was unconstitutional. That act provided for a stay of foreclosure of farm
mortgages, in the discretion of the court, up to three years. During all
such period, the property was subject to control and jurisdiction of the
court. The principal argument advanced against constitutionality of
the statute was that it violated the Fifth Amendment in taking from
the mortgagees the right to control the property during the period of
default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and deprived them
of the right to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver for the
49
satisfaction of the debt. The court said:
"* * * The question which the objections raise is not whether
the Act does more than modify remedial rights. It is whether the
legislation modifies the secured creditor's rights, remedial or substantive, to such an extent as to deny the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. * * *"

The Court concluded that the questioned enactment made

"* *

no

unreasonable modification of the mortgagee's rights * * *". Stated

otherwise, in exercising the powers conferred upon it under the bank'300 U. S. 440 (1937).

4848 Stat. 1289.
"300 U. S. 440 at 470 (1937).
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ruptcy clause of the Constitution,50 the fact that some reasonable interference with the rights of a secured creditor vested prior to congressional action, was not fatal.
In many other instances the Congress has touched upon vested
rights, and in fact impaired the obligations of contracts, in legislating
under the commerce clause. 51 In New York v. United States52 the
State of New York contended that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission directing the railroads to "put intra state passenger
fares, excess baggage charges, sleeping-car surtaxes, and milk rates on
the level with interstate rates", was unconstitutional. The State of
New York had a charter contract with the New York Central Railroad
Company, by which the latter was bound not to charge more than two
cents a mile for passenger carriage between Albany and Buffalo. The
state contended that if the Transportation Act permitted the Interstate
Commerce Commission by such an order to enable the railroad company to violate its contract, it impaired the obligation of a contract,
and further that it deprived the State of New York and her people of
property without due process of law. The Supreme Court, however,
concluded that the continuance of the intrastate rates at their former
level would constitute an "* * * 'undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against interstate * * * commerce', which is declared to be
unlawful and prohibited by sec. 13, par. 4, of the Interstate Commerce
Act, as amended by sec. 416 of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat.
456, 484, and which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized
therein to remove by fixing intrastate rates for the purpose * * *."In
short the paramount power of Congress is not fettered by any necessity to maintain or leave unaffected, existing arrangements. 5 4
'Art. I, § 8, CL. 4, Fed. Const.
"1Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3,Fed. Const.

U. S. 591 (1922).
'Philadelphia, V. & W. R. R. Co. v. Schubert,

2257

5

224 U. S. 6o3, 613, 614 (1912). In
that case the court upheld the power of Congress to abrogate existing arrangements
whereby the receipt of benefits under a company relief plan constituted a waiver of
the right to sue for damages. The court speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes said:
"The power of Congress, in its regulation of interstate commerce, and of commerce in
the District of Columbia and in the Territories, to impose this liability, was not
fettered by the necessity of maintaining existing arrangements and stipulations which
would conflict with the execution of its policy. To subordinate the exercise of the
Federal authority to the continuing operation of previous contracts, would be to
place, to this extent, the regulation of inter-state commerce in the hands of private
individuals, and to withdraw from the control of Congress so much of the field as
they might choose by prophetic discernment to bring within the range of their
agreements. The Constitution recognizes no such limitation. It is of the essence of the-
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In a similar vein William Whiting, in his treatise on "War Powers
Under the Constitution of the United States" 55 stated that one of the
chief objects in the formation of the Union was to "provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States". In discus56
sing the emancipation of the slaves during the Civil War, he stated:
"* * * If it should be urged that to release slaves from their
servitude would be, in effect to impair or destroy ihe obligation
of contracts, it may be replied that though States have no right
to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, Congress is at
liberty to pass such laws. The right to abrogate and cancel the
obligations of apprentices and slaves does not rest solely upon
the power of Congress to appropriate private property to public
use; but it necessarily results in its obligation to use the proper
means to accomplish one of the chief objects for which the Union
was formed, namely, to provide for the common defense and
general welfare * * *"
The question is resolved to a consideration of whether any constitutional warrant is afforded Congress for the exercise of the powers
concerned. Its power to enact the legislation in question must be
sought for in the implied powers attendant upon the power "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers to provide for the common defense, to raise and
support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy. 57 These powers
are commonly called "the war powers."
The relation of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194058
to the war powers of the Congress is demonstrated by reason of the fact
that an army composed of men without morale is an inefficient army
indeed. The Congressional power to provide for the common defense
delegated power of regulation that, within its sphere, Congress should be able to
establish uniform rules, immediately obligatory, which as to future action should
transcend all inconsistent provisions. Prior arrangements were necessarily subject to
this paramount authority."
See also Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170 (192o); Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (1911); De Laval Steam Turbin Co. v. United States,
284 U. S. 61 (1931); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583 (1907); New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U. S. 453 (19o5); C., B. & Q. R. R.
Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561 (igo5); C. & A. R. R. C6. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67 (1915) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211,
230 (1899).

OWhiting, War Powers Under the Constitution of the United States (43rd. ed.).
MWhiting, War Powers Under the Constitution of the United States (43rd. ed.)
26.
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Art. I, § 8, Fed. Const.
68Act of Oct. 17, 1940, Public No. 861, 76th Congress.
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carries with it the power to do whatever is reasonable to insure a complete and efficient defense.
No real question is raised by the enactment regarding the taking of
property without compensation within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. Therefore, cases like Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States,59 have no application. Such cases involve an appropriation by the Government for its own use of property belonging to private parties. It may be interposed that the Congress may not take property from one person and give it to another, or directly alter contracts
between private parties. This objection is answered by the fact that
there is no taking from one person by the Congress and a giving to
another. There is merely a change in contract rights resulting from an
exercise by the Congress of its delegated powers. Such changes have
been uniformly sustained by the Supreme Court. It need appear only
that the change occur in the exercise by the Congress of its paramount
powers.00 These questions were settled by the Supreme Court when it
decided the Legal Tender Cases. 61 In the Legal Tender Cases6 2 the
Court concluded that certain obligations could be satisfied upon payment, dollar for dollar, in irredeemable greenbacks. The obligations
affected were those in existence before enactment of the Legal Tender
Acts. When these obligations were incurred, gold and silver coin alone
were legal tender and every obligation previously incurred in dollars
carried either an express or implied coin clause.
That the United States lacks "the police power" and that this was
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment is true. But it is none
the less true that when the United States exerts any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection can be based
upon the fact that such exercise may be attended by the same incidents
which attend the exercise by a state of its police power, or that it may
tend to accomplish a similar purpose. 63 The "war power" of the United
States, like its other powers and like the police power of the states, is
subject to applicable constitutional limitations. 64 The Fifth Amendment, however, imposes in this respect no greater limitation upon the
5148 U. S. 312

(1892).

OOLynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934). Briefs in the Gold Clause cases:
U.S. v. Bankers Trust Co., Case No. 471 and 472, pp. 83, 87-94; Perry v. U. S., Case

No. 532 pp. 59, 68-69.
612 Wail. 457, 550 (U. S. 1870).
"212 Wall. 457, 550 (U.S. 1870).
3McCrary v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1903) ; Hoke v. United States,
3o8 (1913); United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
4
OEx parte Milligan, 4 Wall.

2, 121-127

(U. S. 1866).
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national power than does the Fourteenth Amendment upon state
power. 65 If the nature and conditions of a restriction upon the use or
disposition of property, or property rights, or the pursuit of remedies
incident thereto is such that a state could, under its police power, impose such a restriction consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment
without making compensation, then the United States may, for a permitted purpose, by a method reasonably calculated- to achieve such
purpose, impose a like restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment without making compensation. 66
It is clear, then, that no exercise of a paramount power of the Congress has been invalidated because it interfered with or destroyed existing contracts. Numerous acts of Congress having such purpose and
effect have been sustained.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to legislative action, requires only that the action be not arbitrary or capricious, and that there be some reasonable relation between it and the
legitimate powers of the Congress. The standard of due process has
thus been laid down by the Supreme Court in Ling Su Fan v. United
67
States:
"To justify the exercise of such a power it is only necessary
that it shall appear that the means are reasonably adapted to
conserve the general public interest and are not an arbitrary
interference with private rights of contract or property. * * *"
The familiar standard equally applicable in a Fourteenth Amend68
ment due process case was repeated in Nebbia v. New York:
"And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held,
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. * * *"
As it has now been settled that reasonable "stay laws", when enacted by the states, are constitutional notwithstanding a resultant impairment of the mortgage contract under emergent conditions,69 it
must follow that the Congress in exercising its granted power "to provide for the common defense" may constitutionally affect contract
rights through legislation enacted with a view to providing for the
15In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448 (1890); Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., '99
U. S. 401, 410 (1905).
'1See supra notes 44 and 54.
61218 U.S.302, 311 (1910).
6291

U. S.

502, 525 (1933).

"Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,

290

U. S. 398 (1933).
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common defense. What higher public necessity is there than the
common defense?
In substance, the legislation constitutes a course of action involving
the exercise of Congressional power to "provide for the common defense and general welfare," to "raise and support armies" and "to promote and maintain a navy." It is manifest that worry over domestic
responsibilities, private debts, and other contractual obligations and
liabilities would tend to impair the morale of our soldiers and sailors
to such an extent that they would in many instances be unable to devote their best thoughts and efforts to their military duties. It must
follow that the Congress not only has the power but also the obligation to do what is reasonable to obviate this disadvantage. The reasonableness of that which is here proposed needs no extended statement.
It is submitted, therefore, that the legislation is constitutional as
falling within the "war power" of Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION

The timely action of Congress in passing this legislation ° is highly
commendable indeed. In contrast to the delay attendant upon enactment of the World War Statute 71 which followed our adoption of Selective Military Service by almost a year, we have had prompt legislative action in this field.
Congress has designed the act so that the extension of credit to men
of Selective Service age will not be frozen3 2 However, because the
process of selection for military service will probably be staggered over
a five-year period, it is the view of many that some alteration in Article
III will be necessitated to protect those men who enter installment contracts and other security transactions between now and the next few
years and who are inducted two, three, four or five years hence.

861,

,'Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o, Act of Oct. 17, 1940, Public No.
7 6th Congress.
7
1Act of March 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 44o.
72Congressional Record, Senate, September 3o, 1940, p. 19364.

